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King Solomon's Judgment Expressing
Principles of Discretion and
Feedback in Legal Rules and
Reasoning
By LAWRENCE C. GEORGE*
When King Solomon ordained that the disputed infant be divided
in two parts,I his decree finally accomplished what his judicial wisdom
could not--the revelation of the identity of the true mother. By yield-
ing her claim, she exhibited an altruistic concern that could only belong
to a "psychological" parent, in the modern terminology of Goldstein,
Freud, and Solnit;2 the ancients were content to infer the biological
from the psychological fact. One might call this a case of "coerced al-
truism," the odor of paradox being explained by the irony of using the
legal process to produce the crucial datum that is supposed to be the
foundation of judgment, instead of its outcome.
This way of looking at the matter draws attention to the morpho-
logical similarity between King Solomon's case and the equally ancient
joke Woody Allen uses to introduce the movie Annie Hall. He says he
would not belong to any club that would consider him worthy of mem-
bership. In a legal setting, consider the value of deciding a modem
custody contest on the consideration that any parent who would insist
upon disputing the child's custodial status quo by exposing him or her-
self and the child to the traumas, delays, disturbances, and expenses of
the legal process, demonstrates a selfish, monomaniacal character in-
consistent with an objective understanding of a child's true "best inter-
ests." This example may be the most deliciously paradoxical form of a
* College of Law, Florida State University. Fellow in Law and I umanities,
Harvard University, 1976. This essay is the belated, perhaps overly fermented fruit of a year
spent in the stimulating company provided by the NEH/Harvard Fellowship program. The
author wishes to express his profound gratitude to the sponsors, now that time and distance
will exempt them from responsibility for his heterodoxy.
1. 1 KINGs 3:16-28.
2. J. GOLDSTEIN, A. FREUD & A. SOLNIT, BEYOND THE BEST INTERESTS OF THE
CHILD (1973).
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general pattern commonly called Catch-22 after the Joseph Heller
novel.
The analysis of legal doctrines to reveal a Catch-22 in their logic,
or operating unconsciously to constrain the options of policymakers, is
a popular tactic of the classroom Socratist. It is almost always good
either for a laugh or for the enlistment of a righteous and reformative
indignation, as circumstances dictate. The object of the following re-
flections is to consider whether the discovery of a Catch-22 situation
should be the end instead of the beginning of analysis. In viewing the
prevalent kinds of such paradoxes, we first shall find that there is noth-
ing logically untenable or intrinsically absurd in the way they are used.
We then will establish the common features and purposes that underlie
such legal ironies. In so doing, we may be able to distinguish new
kinds of legal imperatives, unstated functions assigned to the courts.
Finally, we may use the lessons of this critical exercise to analyze
broadly the functions of reflexivity and feedback in the way legal doc-
trines are stated and applied.
I. Paradox or Trap for the Unwary
Unstated Content of Legal Rules
Taking for a simple paradigm the custody example with which this
discussion began, one might be tempted to express consternation if told
that the rule is: by claiming (exercising) rights, one thereby waives them.
That is to say, by claiming to be the fitter parent, one demonstrates
ceterisparibus that one is relatively unfit-fitness being defined as an
altruism that goes far to avoid a custody fight. It is not here claimed
that any American jurisdiction uses such a positive rule, but the vague-
ness of the "best interest" standard is enough to conceal deliberative
motives that might indeed operate as if this were the rule in some cases.
In all events, this instance is not far off the English rule3 that consent to
a step-parent adoption may be implied from the natural parent's re-
fusal to concur when a caring parent would do so.
A similar cause for bewildered disbelief is found in the teaching of
York v. Texas.4 That case established that state procedure need make
no provision for a special appearance in order to safeguard the consti-
tutional rights of individuals threatened with a jurisdictionally invalid
civil judgment. There is no right to argue to a court that it has no
power over the defendant making that argument. Appearing is an act
3. See In re W., [1971] 2 All E.R. 49.
4. 137 U.S. 15 (1890).
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of consent to jurisdiction even if the consent takes the form of an argu-
ment that no jurisdiction exists. This rule is justified by the view that
there are alternative and fully equivalent protections for the property of
the victim of a void judgment. By using them, .such victims do not
suffer the embarrassing appearance of giving the same act the dual le-
gal significance of objection and acquiescence. The absurdity and
harshness of positive rules that define objection as acquiescence have
led Texas5 and other jurisdictions to adopt procedures that permit di-
rect challenges of personal jurisdiction, but the principle of York has
never been recanted.
Procedural law affords many similar instances of rules that defeat
their intended instrumental purposes simply by being invoked. Indeed,
the central and most universal issue in procedural law is one of ends
and means that can be stated as a puzzle: How can rules be formulated
that may be maintained and observed at a cost that will not dwarf or
duplicate the substantive dispute they are meant merely to orchestrate?
The procedurist's nightmare is the quandary of stating or enforcing a
rule in a way that can only produce a controversy requiring an eviden-
tiary hearing involving every element of the case to be considered at
trial. For instance, a motion to dismiss on grounds of forum non con-
veniens because all of the evidence and rules are more handily avail-
able elsewhere may entail a showing of what the evidence is, who the
witnesses are, and so forth. Often the verbal form of the rule will draw
distinctions that hide or minimize its tendency to invite a plenary trial
as a condition of its implementation. The adoption, however, of rules
that are recursive in fact, is the result of hard choices. It may be the
epitome of frustration in the sphere of law. Certainly, the existence of
such rules poses hard choices for those whom they govern.
What is most striking in the situations we have been describing is
the ambivalent status of an unequivocal act. Something close to a con-
tradiction is involved in the discovery that, in these self-referent
processes, there is no neat grid of Hohfeldian correlatives 6 upon which
to plot relationships between the opposing values in a single act. A
short schedule of near-equivalencies will be enough to illustrate the re-
ality of this problem: seeking custody = proving, pro tanto, unfitness;
appearing = consenting to jurisdiction by disputing it.
Formally, the most typical manifestation of the difficulty is the
statement of a rule in the normal legal manner of antecedent and con-
5. See TEX. R. Civ. P. 120(a).
6. See W. HOHFELD, FUNDAMENTAL LEGAL CONCEPTIONS (1923).
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sequent ("Whoever shall X, shall suffer Y to the extent of Z. . .") but
with the true sequence reversed. What seems to be a condition of relief
or a ground for a remedy is, operationally speaking, a consequence of
proofs-proofs that verbally are supposed to follow, rather than pre-
cede, the existence of the Hohfeldian "right." The trouble here is more
than a matter of grammar, however, and no rearrangement of legal
carts and horses will resolve the dilemmas faced by actors and advisors
confronted with a Catch-22. The fact that we are dealing with ambiv-
alence rather than ambiguity is shown by a slight revision in our sched-
ule of quandaries:




2. But at a second level, the "right" is qualified by:
inference of unfitness
''power" to override reservations
looking "undecided," inconsistent
The temptation to dismiss these doctrinal antinomies is strong
when they are formulated in the manner we have been using for pur-
poses of illustration. It is too easy to say that the costs and qualifica-
tions that accompany the exercise of a right are only its natural
inconveniences: by-products of choice; aspects of the human dilemma;
footnotes to Frost.7 The concept of a "natural" limitation is not the
issue, however, when the real problem is that the statement of a legal
entitlement simply is incomplete. There also is always a question of
whether the qualification must be linked to the "right," particularly as
regards a strong right that is the outcome of a long policy battle (the
decision, for example, to permit alternative and hypothetical plead-
ing).8 There is, finally, a question of honesty in concealing the detri-
ments that inseparably accompany a clearly stated legal right.
Loops, Reversals, Hitches
Now, with more attention to forms, let us consider whether a
Catch-22 is to be found in every instance where the smooth sequence
running from entitlement to remedy is intercepted by an intrinsic pro-
viso. The case of the self-defeating custody contestant is in many ways
the strongest type of a larger class, because it seems to exemplify a legal
7. Frost, The Road Not Taken, in ANTHOLOGY OF FAMOUS ENGLISH AND AMERICAN
POETRY 748 (Benet & Aiken eds. 1945).
8. See C. CLARK, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF CODE PLEADING § 42 (2d ed. 1947).
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version of the esthetic doctrine, more is less. The harder you fight, the
less you get (the worse you look). An image suggests itself for this kind
of rule-the metaphor not of the Catch, but of the Loop. One is con-
fronted with a circularity, but the prospect need not be stultifying. Pru-
dent counsel treats the rule as one requiring wisdom in order to know
how far one may go before one's position begins to double back on
itself. Blind zeal can stretch the Loop so taut that it describes the tra-
jectory of a boomerang. The trouble with a Loop is that it may become
indistinguishable from a noose: a trap for the unwary. The petitioner
for custody is invited to participate in a contest that is at the same time
an experiment, with the petitioner as its unconscious subject. To reveal
the covert importance of the petitioner's overt claims would spoil the
rule entirely by defeating its Solomonic function.
Family law furnishes another instance of frustration that again
serves as a paradigm, allowing the introduction of another metaphor,
the Reversal. Consider the predicament of the abandoned wife seeking
an injunction to prevent her departing husband from regaining his sin-
gle status either in Reno or in Port-au-Prince. If she fears an ex parte
Reno divorce, she can easily show that her remedy at law by way of a
collateral attack on the Nevada judgment is so slender under the doc-
trine of Williams v. North Carolina (11)9 as to be "inadequate." If her
fears, however, turn on a Haitian "quickie," with no full faith and
credit clause behind it, she will fail to show the inadequacy of a subse-
quent direct legal attack on the decree as a sham.'0 As Professor Clark
has noted, I the more feeble the jurisdictional basis of the threatened ex
parte decree, the greater is the need for protection, and, at the same
time, the more feeble are the rights of the stay-at-home to prevent it.
The choice of the husband conceivably could be influenced by an aver-
sion to the effects of a home-state injunction, leading him to prefer Hai-
ti-a result at cross-purposes with any rational policy we might ascribe
to the authors of our jurisdictional rules on divorce. The wife, as
holder of a claim for equitable protection, finds herself in a dilemma
not of her own making, in that she has no control over the venue her
husband may choose for claiming his phony domicile.
The dilemma of the stay-at-home spouse seems to be the outcome
of a rule produced by two policies tugging in different directions.
9. 325 U.S. 226 (1945) (party challenging an exparle sister-state divorce decree must
show that the spouse who obtained the decree did not have valid domicile in the sister state
and that such state's finding of domicile was erroneous).
10. See, e.g, Arpels v. Arpels, 8 N.Y.2d 339, 170 N.E.2d 670, 207 N.Y.S.2d 663 (1960).
11. H. CLARK, CASES AND PROBLEMS ON DOMESTIC RELATIONS 601 (2d ed. 1974).
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There is a background realization that injunctive relief is usually futile
in such cases, but in the foreground there is an announced concern for
the maxim that equity will act only in the absence of an adequate legal
remedy. Again, in the background there is a universal nonjudicially
noticed appreciation that ex parte divorce decrees are jurisidictionally
vulnerable on account of phony claims of domicile used to secure them.
In the foreground, there is an understanding of the difficulty of bring-
ing the situation into the field of judicial cognizance and of the conse-
quent "irreparable" hardship that may be visited upon the stay-at-
home.
It is not necessary to canvass further the policy aspects of this case.
What we need from it is not the optimal solution but an image of the
type of jam that the conflicting considerations of policy have produced.
More becomes less in the present example in this way: the stronger the
need, the weaker the prospects for success. This paradox amounts to
more than a Catch and is distinct from a Loop. It is rather like the
torture of Tantalus, whose increasing thirst reduced the level of the
stream in which he stood, and whose increasing hunger elevated the
fruit-laden bough that hung just above his reach. As the victim of such
arrangements has no choice, we must call this case a delusion, rather
than a snare. The delusion, however, is only an occasional source of
disappointment, or else the promise of relief would be quite transparent
and never fool anybody. Pennsylvania wives have, in fact, obtained
injunctions against Nevada-bound mates.' 2 The trick here is that when
one carries the rationale for relief to its logical consequence, in a
straightforward argument a fortiori, there is apt to be a sudden and
total reversal of the consequences. A crying need suddenly looks to the
decisionmaker like a clear case at law. The polarity of the argument
has changed, like the optical illusion created by those geometrical
boxes that are sometimes top-uppermost and sometimes bottom-upper-
most when projected onto the plane of a sheet of paper.
If it were possible to freeze the box in one of its orientations, then
we quite literally would know where we stand in the field of three
dimensions that our perceptual apparatus constructs from such images.
It is impossible to do so, and there is room for more than a suspicion
that a similar reversing polarity sometimes distorts the faculty of judg-
ment.' 3 No amount of wariness provides a path to escape Reversal
12. See, e.g., Monihan v. Monihan, 438 Pa. 380, 264 A.2d 653 (1970).
13. See the discussion of Newcomb's paradox at note 28 infra.
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traps. A legal claim at one moment seems to have a favorable signifi-
cance and at the next an unfavorable one.
The outlines of doctrine, however, remain simple and clear. No
confusion exists about the facts, nor about their moral and legal import
in matters like that of the absconding husband; yet one must remain in
doubt as to the outcome of a case based on them. What best accounts
for this conundrum is a matter of considerable mystery. Let it suffice
for the moment to note that the value of a state of affairs, from a legal
perspective, is precisely and unambiguously correlated with a rule, pro-
ducing a "right" (or a "no right") in the simplest version of the
Hohfeldian schema. There is, however, a hidden switch, a gate, that
sometimes connects the case proven with "no right" and at other times
with "right." This "contradiction" is apparent and not real because
only one position of the switch is possible at a given moment. But it is
not a happy state of affairs.
A Loop, on the other hand, can be felicitous. A petitioner faced
with a Loop may through wariness outwit the rulemaker. The party
has only to observe how far to go before the case becomes self-defeat-
ing. The rule appears to offer a continuous series of options: the
pleader may go farther and farther, seeming to progress as he cumu-
lates his proofs, yet suddenly encounter his footprints in the sand. Such
rules are considered unhealthy by psychologists. Parents and children
are aware of the elements of this form of social control. It has for its
object a lesson in moderation and is, therefore, antithetical to tradi-
tional legal concern with spheres of absolute autonomy.14 Success, in
the sense of achievement of one's maximal entitlement becomes a mat-
ter of compromise or of adjustment. A vignette treating the courtroom
as a playpen may illustrate the point:
"May it please the court, I am the better custodian for my child."
"Petition denied."
"May it pretty please the court, I really want that child!"
"Hmm, here is a really caring parent . . . . However, petition
denied."
"May it pretty please the court with sugar on it, we need each
other!"
14. The mode of legal thought that Professor Duncan Kennedy describes as "classic"
(in a work itself of that caliber) emphasizes the importance of "spheres." The present notes,
while owing much to Kennedy's descriptive scheme, subordinate a review of the change
from classic to modem ideology of law in favor of the present effort to describe what under-
lies both styles and provides continuity between them. See Kennedy, Form and Substance in
Private Law 4dudication, 89 HARV. L. REV. 1685, 1725-37 (1976).
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"Blinded by zeal, this petitioner is unable to take the larger view
Petitioners soon learn from this process of character-building that if
they are to be given any chance at all, they had better stop somewhere
near midpoint.
The Loop and the Reversal are not the only major species of the
genus we have designated Catch-22. To complete our rough tabulation
of the field, we must consider the Hitch. When a trial judge uses his
power of remittitur, the loser of a jury verdict obtains a conditional
right to a new trial.15 Let us suppose the judge has acted abusively or
erroneously in ordering the remittitur-that both winner and loser see
reversal as the probable result on appeal. The prudent maximizer in-
terprets this situation as an instance of necessity. A discount must be
offered to the holder of the conditional new trial order, not as large as
that which the judge specified, perhaps, but of the same order of mag-
nitude as the costs of refusing to remit "the excess" in the verdict, going
through a second trial, risking a defeat or a lower award therein, ap-
pealing the resulting judgment, gaining a reversal, and then, ultimately,
collecting on the original verdict.
The verdict winner has a right to pursue matters through all of
these steps,' 6 but remittitur is intended to be, and is, coercive because
the right is of value chiefly or even exclusively as an economic counter.
If the law were intent upon treating the issue of its propriety with strict
impartiality, it would be necessary to allow a verdict winner who
finally establishes the "adequacy" of the original damage award an ad-
ditional sum, above the normal "costs of appeal," to be measured by
the interest on the judgment that ought to have been entered promptly
after rendition of the first verdict, plus a premium value for the expo-
sure to loss occasioned by the failure to remit damages as invited by the
trial judge, plus, of course, fees to counsel for the second trial. Only
such an approach would have promise of making the choice whether or
not to remit some of the verdict a "free" one. 17
This description of remittitur is not intended as a challenge to the
policy embodied in that practice. Rather, it is the element of fiction in
the structure of remittitur that justifies it being singled out as an exam-
ple of the Hitch, suitable for generalization and application to like
cases in the class.
15. See, e.g., Dimick v. Schiedt, 293 U.S. 474 (1935).
16. See Note, Appealability of Judgments Entered Pursuant to Remittiturs in Federal
Courts, 1975 DUKE L.J. 1150.
17. Id. at 1156.
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A Hitch begins with a simple finding, entailing a clear and positive
consequence; for example, the present verdict may be so high that it
must be inferred that the jury was carried away by sympathy, passion,
and prejudice; therefore, the motion for a new trial is granted. How-
ever, the granting of the motion is then made conditional in accordance
with a suppressed minor premise. It is supposed that the extent of the
distortions produced by that inferential passion and prejudice can be
quantified, stated, and made the subject of a second clause: the grant-
ing of the new trial is ordered unless there should be an agreement to
accept the estimation of the judge regarding the amount of the
"'excess."18
From the viewpoint of the verdict-loser, who was given a new trial
in the first breath, the placing, in the second breath, of the efficacy of
the new trial order entirely within the control of the verdict-winner is a
major Hitch, that the loser is helpless to obviate. The consequence of
the finding of "passion or prejudice" is somehow deflected in order to
generate coercive power against the verdict-winner. The winner's
power to accept or reject the judge's offer of a lesser judgment is con-
sidered to be a sensible way to compensate for the pressure to discount
the claim, as noted above. The Hitch thus can be seen as an artful way
of transforming the court into a bargaining agent, as well as an arbiter
of legal differences, so that the dual roles can be employed to save the
bother and expense of relitigation.
The Function of Paradoxical Rules
Each of the cases we have considered presents an example of the
transformation of a legal antithesis-a polarized, black/white is-
sue-into a mediating principle. The virtue of mediating principles is
that they provide a cover of rationality and tradition to conceal the
process of incremental change that goes on as the decision-maker is
forced to take more matters into account than were contemplated when
rules were originally written.
The Loop is a pure instance of an either/or decision being
grounded upon an intuitive and cumulative impression of more-or-less.
The Reversal-is an instance of legal clarity (that is, polarity) being re-
tained, while the polarizing values are hidden-so that identic proofs,
18. The federal guide for sizing the discount is to estimate the "highest maximum
which the jury could reasonably find." Gorsalitz v. Olin Mathieson Chem. Corp., 429 F.2d
1033, 1046 (5th Cir. 1970). But see Meissner v. Papas, 35 F. Supp. 676, 677 (E.D. Wis. 1940),
aj§'d, 124 F.2d 720 (7th Cir. 1941) (using standard of "lowest amount" that could reasonably
be found by the jury).
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differing only in the intensity of the impression they create, produce
opposing outcomes. Finally, the Hitch, by creating a complication that
is extrinsic to the rationale of the polar rule, manages to retain the
forms of a branching legal logic while introducing ever-newer levels of
parentheses until the desired degree of flexibility is reached.
The necessity in law of such rationalizing styles as the Loop, the
Reversal, and the Hitch is neither logical nor political. The appearance
of irony or inconsistency could usually be avoided, and often is avoided
when brought to consciousness, through a more careful and expansive
specification in the positive law of rights and duties-or else through an
abandonment of pretense in favor of a frankly administrative, open-
ended, and instrumental statement of the functions of the decision-
maker. The necessity that dictates that formal statements of law must
be studded with Loops, Reversals, and Hitches is a necessity of style. It
follows from the retention of legal formalism as the vehicle for stating a
regime of administrative flexibility. 19 In order to retain its respect as a
transcendent and authoritative writ, a statement of "law" that can gov-
ern the individuals who have powers of interpretation must be quite
general, rigid, and relatively unqualified.20 If generalities must be cho-
sen in order to provide the semblance of consistency between cases, the
same constraints require the isolation of relatively few determinative
circumstances, which then are coupled with governing norms in a man-
ner that indicates a strict entailment. The rhetoric of the syllogism,
together with the reality of discretion, produce the distinctive and often
amusing spectacle of the Positive Baroque doctrine, rule, or opinion.
Its highest ornaments are the Loop, the Reversal, and the Hitch.
There is a further reason for the necessity of such gambits in the
discourse of the law. They provide counsel with tangible assignments:
theses and antitheses, formal "issues" that are essential to the dialecti-
cal forms of our adversary procedure. These features of legal style in-
troduce points of division that facilitate litigation at the same time that
they mediate between the positive and negative interpretation of the
same circumstances. Mediation is, after all, a division of differences as
much as it is a composition of divergencies through finding a point of
equilibrium between them.
When passions are high, as they so often are in litigation, and
when the rules are clear, the victories total, and the defeats abject, then
the mediating principle comes into its glory. Imagine duellists back to
19. See F. VON HAYEK, THE CONSTITUTION OF LIBERTY 212-14 (1960); Jones, The Rule
of Law and the Welare State, 58 COLUM. L. REV. 143 (1958).
20. L. FULLER, THE MORALITY OF THE LAW 46 (1964).
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back, ready to step off their paces. The line between their heels divides
the field of their combat arbitrarily but effectively, just as it may give
unity to the series of exchanges across the line in a suite of amicable
transactions aimed at resolving controversy. In order to accomplish
such feats, the intellectual line that we describe as a mediating principle
must have the property of being visible in only one aspect at a time.
The same principle therefore may serve to integrate and complete the
structures of two opposing arguments; it is the party wall of legal order,
defining separate domains.
The kinds of duality we have been dealing with arise when the
underlying principles are seen from some other or larger perspective
than the one chosen by the formulators of doctrine. A Loop, Reversal,
or Hitch is rarely a disingenuous dodge. The perceived need for a way
to invert or distort the force of an argument may come from private or
political motives. More often than not, however, the adoption of one of
these devices is honestly believed to be correct-a subtle answer to a
crude position, or the explication of a moral nuance hitherto implicit in
the course of legal development. The fallibility of orderings in which
coherence is purchased at the cost of unconscious irony is not remedia-
ble either through increased self-consciousness or through the aban-
donment of generalized norms. We are condemned to rationalize with
the help of principles that seem to us adequate for the tasks of relating
moral categories to legal fiats, political conceptions to ideas of a pre-
political human nature, legal entitlements to equitable restraints upon
their "exercise," and so on, through a vast tabulation of the topics that
give living-together its diversity of creed and orientation.
IL Self-Betrayal or Balancing Act?
Each of the examples chosen to illustrate the Loop, the Reversal,
and the Hitch presents an instance of how plausibility may turn to spe-
ciousness. The sudden awareness of a duality in public policy, or in
one's own perception of political or moral consistency, can often be
elicited by the forms of reductio ad absurdum to which we have given
the designations Loop, Reversal, and Hitch. That, however, does not
necessarily mean that a duality once recognized will disappear, in the
manner of a fallacy exposed. Exposing a "mediating concept" is more
likely to result in a reexamination, followed by a restatement of the
variable that most directly affects decision. It is true that there may be
occasions when the process of reexamination is so long overdue, and
the concept reexamined is so fictional or outworn, that a substantial
revision in doctrine ensues. The master craftsman of opinion writing,
May 19791
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however, can probably detect and preserve an ideal of justice that
works through to sound results even in the most captious instances of
legal doublethink.
The result dictated by one concept of justice in domestic relations
cases would require, for example, that the abandoned wife be assured
that her economic interest in her marriage would be undamaged by an
ex parte divorce. 21 If this means revising the law of her domicile on the
consequences of such migratory divorces, that issue should be squarely
faced,22 as should the fact of the state's impotence to regulate or pro-
hibit migration for the purpose of securing a divorce. The self-defeat-
ing parent seeking custody could be told forthrightly that the "best
interest" standard is flexible and that it bends in the direction of "lib-
eral" (or "strict") interpretation when a petitioner invokes it in deroga-
tion of the developmental satisfactoriness of the status quo.23 For the
somewhat more complicated issue of remittitur, the "right" to annul a
trial judge's order granting a new trial (by the expedient of "con-
senting" to the judge's assessment of the appropriate level of discount)
could be made to appear innocuous.
The awkwardness of coercing "consent" would be corrected by au-
thorizing a defined power at the trial level to impose such a discount,
but limited to the magnitude of the expected "overhead" costs of re-
trial, appellate review, and so on. Each of these sketchy solutions to the
problem of justification is a case of looking to a higher level of general-
ity, and a greater degree of candor, in seeking the appropriate place for
introducing one's reasons for complicating the enforcement of rather
elementary principles of legal morality.
Introducing Feedback into Decisionmaking
The shape of the problems we have been describing is pyramidal.
The problems of legal consistency and clarity frequently are matters of
articulating one principle upon or in relation to another. This typically
leads to a series of premises, with specifications, cross-references, and
provisos arranged more or less on the pattern of the Internal Revenue
Code, having a master concept like "income" at the summit and a li-
21. See Vanderbilt v. Vanderbilt, 354 U.S. 416 (1957); Estin v. Estin, 334 U.S. 541
(1948).
22. See Stambaugh v. Stambaugh, 222 Pa. Super. Ct. 360, 294 A.2d 817 (1972).
23. See Vanden Heuvel v. Vanden Heuvel, 254 Iowa 1391, 1405, 121 N.W.2d 216, 224
(1963) (Thompson, J., dissenting) ("In this situation there is an old rule which expresses the
commonsense experience of men over the centuries. It is that when we cannot be certain we
should leave well enough alone.").
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brary at the base. Another view, however, more fittingly applies to sit-
uations where the complications of doctrine are not steps in a process
leading to an ever-narrowing specification of the precise rule. Instead
of exceptions to exceptions in a dendritic thicket of parentheses, what is
called for in describing the case of the self-defeating custody petitioner
is the simple image of the Loop, with which we began. In more preten-
tious terms, the law can be said to need at times to introduce a principle
of feedback. It must take account of its own accountings and its own
effects on primary actors.
It is awkward, and perhaps nearly impossible, in terms of right
and corresponding duty or privilege, to describe a justifiable instance of
legal feedback. One might say that a parent has the unconditional
"right" to the procedural, dignity-respecting, serious, judicial consider-
ation of his or her overall worth, future prospects, and present ability to
care for a child, and that this right will be understood and enforced by
permitting a parent to file a modification petition at any time the other
parent has custody.24
The problem is not simply one of having merely a "right" to the
honest exercise of an open discretion. There are and there should be
cases, of which the self-defeating parent is exemplary, when honest
counsel or the public writ of the law provides the citizen with notice
that: 1) there is nearly no discretion to grant what may nevertheless
freely be requested; and 2) there is no way of stating in advance with
accuracy that the case of any particular parent is outside the scope of a
discretion that may allow reversal on the issue of best interests of a
child. It may be stretching a point to call this kind of discretionary
power "legal," as it seems to exemplify a form of domination and an
openness to idiosyncrasy that is antithetical to the rule of law.
The chancellor who decides a custody dispute is not, however, an
administrator whose guidance is to be found in goals and objectives of
public policy. The chancellor is a private dispute-settler, looking to the
prospective consequences of decisions, to be sure, but at the same time,
we may reasonably hope, looking to a community conscience. The
chancellor's official sensibility knows that there are such things in liti-
gants as selfish and hidden drives and motives and that claims of right,
when made stridently and with certain kinds of proof too commonly
available in a domestic relations context, are dependable evidence of
what psychologists call "regression" to a relatively less mature level of
24. Reformists would introduce a period of repose after each custody ruling. See, e.g.,
UNIFORM MARRIAGE AND DIVORCE ACT § 409.
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behavior. If the positive writ of the law confers powers to take account
of the very childishness of some types of litigation, that may be a mark
of sensitivity, as well as an invitation to abuse.
The fault with such doctrines, and with the image of a feedback
loop as a way of organizing our sense of justness, is that they must
ultimately discriminate between individuals on the basis of infinites-
simal differences. Not only that, but, as the case of the self-defeating
parent demonstrates, the basis for such a discrimination either cannot
be profitably articulated (of what use is it to tell a citizen, "You are not
legally unfit, but I find you, on the whole, a vindictive, shallow,
immature . . . altogether less worthy claimant than your adversary?")
or else, if articulated, will prove to be a matter of grace. We should not
look for more candor and more generality in the expression of what
may, after all, be sound and achievable goals of interpersonal fairness.
Instead, we must take the case of the custody-feedback loop as simply a
matter where the adult petitioner is as much exposed to the predilec-
tions and personality of the chancellor as to the touchstones of an an-
nounced norm. The outcome is, in principle, beyond the control of the
litigants-even if they could manufacture whatever evidence they
deemed most persuasive-and beyond the prophetic powers of a legal-
istic analysis.
'Rules' that Conceal Judicial Discretion
There is a shift in the mode, but not in the fact, of principled con-
trol in a legal regime with feedback characteristics. Using a "rule" that
is variable in ways not directly keyed to evidence, and is, therefore,
imprecise, the intelligent advisor (or the careful appellate court) may
divine a kind of consistency and even-handedness in results that will
afford the paid-for prophets of the bar a basis for prediction as reliable
as most black-letter doctrines permit.
The probable outcome in such cases is quite literally observable, as
far as it is given to judges and others to "see" the facets of character
that constitute the merits of the respective contestants. The range of
judicial idiosyncrasy is much broader in principle than it is in practice.
Even in principle, however, the discrimination possible under a legal
rule like the "best interest" standard, interpreted with plenty of feed-
back, may be a sound and desirable, authoritative and controlled dis-
cretion. The chancellor may be seen to have been duly constituted to
act as the public uncle, the embodiment of the moral consensus of the
community. If there is no real consensus on the rights and wrongs of
entitlement to custody, the failure of the people to posit any "law" for
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such cases may indicate a willingness to accept the prevailing doctrine,
however absurd it may be to legalistic rationality-tender-years pre-
sumptions and the like.25 Even though rulings based on evaluating in-
dividuals-as if the custody contest were an employment interview in
which the court were empowered to hire a person to be a par-
ent--conflict with the ideal of the rule of law, an even greater doubt
exists as to the propriety of following legal forms for the rendering of
the decision.
The exigencies of appellate review require determinations to be
made with reference to "findings" based on "evidence" properly in-
cluded in a "record." In a case involving applications of feedback, this
record folds back upon itself and becomes more than the sum of its
parts. The aberrant result is not a matter of error, and the occasional
reversal should not be regarded as a precedent making "law." The en-
tire system of legal ideology, though, operates to constrain the courts
and the bar to stake their positions in the categories of "grounds" and
their proofs. Disagreement and reversal in a case where the principle
of decision is really a matter of making close calls as a statement of
impressionist judgment must therefore implicate the courts as well as
the litigants inpersonal disputes with one another. The elaboration of
Loops, Hitches, and Reversals is a response to the threat of incivility
through a transformation to rule-like forms in order to mask a rule of
discretion. This masking is what is meant by "rationalization" in its
most pejorative sense.
The example of the Loop, which involves disputants in a dialogue
about the shagginess of the shaggy dog at its most fundamental level, is
paralleled by the case of the Hitch, which exemplifies the exception that
should not be understood as a general qualification on a legal entitle-
ment, to be applied irrespective of person and place. At least in their
origins, Hitches have the charm of new discoveries and the genial
flavor of the explanation arrived at ad hoc. "Ordinarily, the rule would
require X, but in the present case, to order X would be to ."
That is the sort of preamble that goes with Hitches and that contrib-
utes, sometimes mightily, to the interstitial development of the common
law.
The present essay is not concerned with all Hitch-like doctrines.
Our interest is with the Hitch that comes in a pair or is hitched to other
Hitches in such a way that we may be reasonably certain that the deci-
sion-maker will determine the case in accordance with some inarticu-
25. See State v. Watts, 77 Misc. 2d 178, 350 N.Y.S.2d 285 (Fain. Ct. 1973).
THE HASTINGS LAW JOURNAL
late feedback principle that decides whether the occasion requires
applying a simple rule or, to the contrary, the imposition of a Hitch. In
its most general form, the Hitch is exemplified by estoppel-more par-
ticularly, by that element in estoppel doctrine that resists restatement in
definitive form in advance of particular cases, thereby relegating the
notion to the sphere of equity for all time.
Just as the Loop, when fairly understood, is a rather elegant way
of achieving fairness, there is a case to be made for the necessity and
the equity of the Hitch. It is very hard to state a positive rule in a
naked and categorical form. Those little adverbial modifiers, like
knowingly, import volumes of Hitches. On a somewhat higher scale,
the rule without a few provisos is as rudimentary as the Decalogue.
Hitches give all rules their clarity (if any), provide them with definition,
and set their limits. When a well-conceived rule is able to capture the
elements triggering its application, the Hitch will figure prominently in
helping the draftsman to avoid such awkward, mealy-mouthed, and
tongue-forking expressions as "Sometimes, a person who does X will
be . . ." or "A person who X's without lawful excuse. . . ." It is not,
however, the formal merits of the Hitch that require the admiration of
those who would attain the sublime objective of fitting the rule to the
fullest understanding of the case. Rather, it is the capacity of Hitches
to deflect or intercept the logical outcome of a categorical rule in cir-
cumstances where the law risks being an ass. We need to be able to
distinguish the case where a Hitch really does specify the limit of a
rulemaker's intention from the case where it embodies an intention not
to decide in advance of the data.
Reversals are harder to save from the imputation of treachery. A
Reversal commonly involves the keying of a legally significant fact to
more than one norm, as we have seen.26 If it were possible to amplify
the notice that the single proof is ambivalent, some kinds of difficulty
would be minimized. Counsel would appreciate the dangerousness of
piling up the demonstrations of irreparable harm while neglecting the
force of those demonstrations as evidence that "where there is a wrong,
there is a remedy [at law] .'27 The virtue of some Reversals, at least, is
that they come closer than any other of the devices we have discussed
to conforming the words of the law to its practices. There are dangers
and trade-offs in any chosen course of action, not excepting the charted
courses described in positive legal language describing rights and enti-
26. See E. GOFFMAN, FRAME ANALYSIS (1974).
27. The maxim is even codified. See CAL. CIV. CODE § 3523 (West 1970).
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tlements. By suddenly changing the polarity of an argument or a proof,
the Reversal provides a flash of sudden and genuine enlighten-
ment-but this is a thrill that is most often purchased by seeming to
spring traps on the unwary. We ought, therefore, to seek wherever pos-
sible for ways to transform the Reversal into a statement that looks
more like a Hitch or a Loop. Besides its vulnerability to charges of
being a trap, the Reversal is open to challenge on the ground that a
truly ambivalent issue is never resolved by such tricks as the statement,
"But counsel has proved too much . . . ." The fact that the court has
the last say is no reason for giving it the edge. Perhaps if counsel were
permitted to prove even more, the equities would resume their original
appearance.
The Reversal will not figure prominently in our conclusions about
the role of feedback in the refinement of legal doctrine, for the reasons
stated. Before dropping this subject altogether, however, we must note
the inadvisability of treating all Reversals as blemishes to be covered or
cauterized at any cost from the visage of Justice. Only a Reversal can
adequately capture the authentic instance of a legal paradox, the true
dilemma, the quandary, that experience confronts us with collectively
(as lawgiving and law-abiding persons) as often as it does individually.
As an instance of this point, consider how one might express, as a rule,
the grounds for one's judgment if presented with a choice between the
alternatives posited in Newcomb's paradox. 28 A puzzle of such pure
28. The paradox may be stated as follows: Suppose yourself to be closely encountered
by a stranger who informs you that he is visiting earth to confirm experimentally his hypoth-
esis that the human mind is a very simple and predictable mechanism, so that he may com-
plete his graduate studies. You are allowed to be a subject-the 100,000th subject, in
fact-in his investigation by participating in a situation of choice that should be entirely
profitable and painless. In your presence (and before witnesses of your choice) the creature
exhibits $1,000,000 in cash and an additional $1,000 also in cash. He places the $1,000 in a
box marked "A" on a table before you. Then, obscuring your vision but not that of the
witnesses, he either places the $1,000,000 in a second box, marked "B," or else he does not
do so. After that he leaves the room and gives you ample time to reflect on which of two
options you may take: you may have and keep the contents of both boxes, "A" and "B,"
which will assure you of at least $1,000 gain, or you may elect to take only the contents of
box "B." One other item of information: in all but .01% of the previous experiments, the
subject's choice was correctly predicted by the creature. The creature has announced that
his prediction of your choice, confidentially disclosed to your witnesses, has lead him to
place $1,000,000 in box "B" on/ y fthe prediction is that you will elect to take box "B" alone.
If the prediction was that you would elect to receive the contents of both boxes, "B" will
have been left empty. Empty or full, both boxes are now in the control of your most trusted
associates, who are unable to tell you what they know concerning the creature's actions.
For the original and more complete account of the paradox and its attempted solutions,
see Gardner, Mfathematical Games, SCIENTIFIC AM., July 1973, at 104.
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form as Newcomb's will hopefully stimulate more introspection than
an instance taken from the frailities of law.
No analyst of the paradox to date has come up with a reasoned
choice for one of the options that is not entirely persuasive-and en-
tirely refuted by the reasons for making the contrary choice. 29 As with
many Reversals, however, at first appearance there seems to be but one
rational choice to the person seeking to maximize gain. The paradox
reveals a capacity for rationality itself to take on conflicting aspects and
to work Reversals on what is perceived as the necessary outcome of
logical thought.
III. Intuition, Verbalization, Discretion
'Unless' as a Qualification of Rules
All of the foregoing examples have been used by judges because of
the inadequacy of one of the central particles of legal discourse. The
dissections of the common forms of legal irony and the talk about the
value of feedback are both mere criticisms of one ubiquitous word and
of the more pervasive concept that it designates. The word is unless.
Other expressions, like provided, also seek to introduce the contingen-
cies and the qualifications that form the foundations of doctrines ex-
pressed in universal and categorical terms. There is probably no word
more subtle than unless, and legal discourse offers nothing less capable
of being instanced in advance of particular occasions.
The forms of unless can cover every kind of exception and qualifi-
cation, and they may range over a series of values, starting with the
value of great specificity ("unless the plaintiff be red of hair") to the
value of nuance and shading ("unless the court is satisfied that X rea-
sonably believed . . ."). Yet there is doubt regarding the performance
of this term, and its relatives, in discharging its legal office. If that of-
fice is conceived as the statement of niceties and qualifications where
our sense of justice and of stopping-points would have them placed,
then why has the law so kindly embraced the strategy of prolixity? It
seems as though the lawyers have almost invented prolixity in response
29. Many reason inductively from the high accuracy and the large sample of the crea-
ture's past predictions that he is highly unlikely to err on the present occasion. They there-
fore opt to take box "B" only. Others rely upon the irreversibility of physical causes and
reason that the money in box "B" must remain there if it were left there at all, so that a
decision to take the contents of box "A" may be reached freely and with impunity. This
casting of a logical puzzle in terms that call for the exercise of prudential reasoning raises
interesting issues for deterrence theory and other areas of the law, as well as the ones dealt
with here.
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to a well-grounded fear of the omitted exception, or the statement that
excepts what should be included, through inadvertent omission of a
term in an already prolix catalog of foreseen examples. The clause be-
ginning with unless rarely simplifies the statement of which it forms a
part.
Despite its faults, unless is a good compass for dividing a field. It
is useful, for example, in offering grammatical parallels to the agonistic
forms of procedure, handily dividing the elements of a prima facie case
from defensive matter. Lending itself to divisions, and to dialectical
forms, the term unless may sometimes help-to simplify the expression
of a complex rule by reducing the need for adverbs and adjectives in its
governing clause. This strength in the traditional forms of legal state-
ment is crucially dependent on a primitive style of thought that gains
its clarity from tactics of division and apposition. In an important
sense, the forms using unless to segregate the contingencies and qualifi-
cations surrounding an imperative statement depend on an ancient and
unconscious analogy between law and geography.
When a rule is described by the metes and bounds of its excep-
tions, our concept of it takes the image of a "field" of application. The
metaphors of geography and geometry, which generate the lore and the
language of meum and tuum are ubiquitous. We can hardly escape
thinking as solons with the same images that animated the thought of
the original Solon. "Fields" are divisible through grants and reserva-
tions, and that is also how burdens are allocated (ie., assigned to a
place), even though the rules we are speaking of are only procedural.
Virtually every feature of the legal personality is conceived as a kind of
tenure, a holding on to what belongs to one, as a matter of right.30 It is
as if the possessor of rights were seized of his individuality by some
deed, depending upon an antecedent survey of the domain of persons,
as subjects. There is no avenue of escape in the recasting of doctrine
into "spheres" of autonomy and the like; such recasting merely trans-
forms a world ruled by plane geometry into a space described by solid
geometry. Nor will we become fully conscious of our debt to the ety-
mology of our terms by adopting the positive stance that regards legal
relations as "powers" to do or to be exempt from or to be able to re-
quire certain behaviors.
This effort at a purely social description of the phenomenon avoids
30. Sir Isaac Newton's usage is of interest as an example of the 17th century sense of
"right." He speaks of the tendency of bodies in motion tc describe "right" (ie., straight)
lines. Legal right is still conceived of as a social relation by which possessors and posses-
sions are connected by straight lines.
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the more obvious images of space and its occupation. The rhetoric as-
sociated with power terminology, however, is often antilegal in its in-
tent,31 while remaining tied to the ancient references to mine and thine,
as for example when words like "domination" come into play.32 It is
tempting to make a great issue out of the doctrine that is so confounded
with the common vocabulary of the law that it can be brought to con-
sciousness only with the aid of a dictionary33-but the object of our
present remarks on the grammar and the language of legal discourse is
rather more oblique. We wish to indicate how antithetical the tradition
of geographical terminology is to the expression of norms with terms
that are recursive or self-referent.
There is little room for multiple uses of the social realm, for shared
values, and for party walls in a statement that first lays down the law
and then qualifies its domain. As rights in real property are the para-
digm for legal discourse in all other fields, we may be well aware of the
subtlety with which diverse or overlapping interests can be accommo-
dated through language of easement, reservation, and limitation. Even
so, the skill of the lawyer is essential to translate the law's dogmatic
dicta into the intricate adjustments of communal living. Those divi-
sions and subdivisions of "legalese" attain a delicacy worthy of the
later style of Henry James, as the master of opinion-giving borrows
dogmas from the unless side of a complex legal doctrine in order to give
specific, yet guarded, instructions on what may or must be done to ac-
complish a goal or avoid a penalty.
It is no longer correct, if ever it was, to say that the law knows no
such thing as a lob:34 that a stone may not be cast molliter el molli
manu. That is not how one pleads, nor how one would codify the rules
on battery. But the ability of lawyers to forbid all batteries, including
lapidations, while still giving due consideration to the manner and
force of a stone's trajectory is beyond question. We know the drafts-
men can do it, because the rule that might distinguish lobs from pegs
would turn upon a straightforward distinction, and it is for the policy-
31. The "classical" or bourgeois notion of legality is inconsistent with Marxist interpre-
tations of law as the expression of power relationships.
32. See, e.g., T. SCHROYER, CRITIQUE OF DOMINATION, PART 11 (1973).
33. The tremendous power and eloquence of reflections based upon etymological in-
sights is attested to by the works of Hannah Arendt. See particularly What is Authority?, in
BETWEEN PAST AND FUTURE 91 (1961). In a more directly legal vein, see Koffier, The As-
similation of Law and Literature: an Approach to Metanoia, in III A.S.L.A. FORUM 5 (1978).
34. See Cole v. Maunder, 2 Roll. Abr. 548 (K.B. 1635), trans. in J. AMES, CASES ON
PLEADING 2 (1875).
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maker to decide whether the distinction should amount to a cognizable
difference.
Verbalizing Recognitions and Intuitions
While great skill and creativity may be shown in turning caveats
into adjectives, the limits of expression are reached when the cognition
to be formulated as a prescription of law is in fact only a re-cognition.
The recursive rule that states that the award is to be given to the person
whose proof is "just right" (in comparison to the cases made by adver-
saries) is dependent upon some prior notion of the golden mean. This
intuition could come from Aristotle35 or Goldilocks, but whether the
issue is obscenity36 or parental superiority or the excessiveness of a ver-
dict, one can recognize only what one has seen already. The law can-
not posit such an image whose counterpart will be confidently
recognized when encountered in life; it can only invoke perceptions
that have been given common form in the settled habits of a language
group.
Much of legal instruction is devoted to the exposure and the ridi-
cule of students' propensities to know what they see, without the medi-
ation of a positive rule entitling one to use the faculties of recognition
or intuition. The taboo against the gut reaction is rooted in a moral
notion of the invidious. There can be no contest when the outcome is
decided by the accidents of history or the qualities of contestants that
come near, or miss, a mark that is only recognized. There can be no
just measure at all without commensurable and properly adopted crite-
ria of measurement.
Difficulties in dealing with recognitions and intuitions become
much more intractable when the "standard" of law is similar to one of
our introductory examples, sharing the feature of turning or folding
back upon itself. The specific authorization in Federal Rule of Civil
Procedure 65 to treat a hearing for a preliminary injunction as a ple-
nary trial37 is of interest here, as it marks a stage in the evolution of
doctrine that may be generalized to other cases. Rule 65 contemplates
a need to cope with emergent occasions on an emergency basis, when
changes are occurring that could moot a claim of right based upon
some antecedent status quo. The propriety of ordering a freeze in any
35. See ARISTOTLE, NICOMACHEAN ETHICs, bk. V, ch. 3.
36. See Jacobellis v. Ohio, 378 U.S. 184, 197 (1964) (Stewart, J., concurring).
37. "Before or after the commencement of the hearing of an application for a prelimi-
nary injunction, the court may order the trial of the action on the merits to be advanced and
consolidated with the hearing of the application .... " FED. R. Civ. P. 65(a)(2).
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given set of circumstances is always a matter of contention and doubt,
for one party's stability is the other's change. The principles of equity
have long required a balancing of the hardships and prediction of the
likely outcome of a full-scale trial on the merits, as preconditions to the
issuance of a preliminary injunction.38 Our discussion of the Catch-22
syndrome would lead us to predict what has in fact occurred: a ten-
dency of the proofs incident to the application for a preliminary injunc-
tion to replicate the proofs presented in the hearing for a permanent
injunction. Hence, we get the permissive treatment of what is nomi-
nally provisional as being in fact final. Inconveniences amounting to
deprivation of due process (or at least of some otherwise available use-
ful processes) may be imposed on a defending party if the real crux of a
case is the issuance or denial of what is provisional in name but dispos-
itive in fact.
Practice under Rule 65 has not yet come to a point of coalescence
of the provisional and the final proceeding. Their "overlap" is neither
mandatory nor complete. It is observable, however, that the distinction
that is so clear in theory between reliefpendente lite and the permanent
injunction often breaks down in practice. So often, indeed, does this
occur that the rule itself reflects and permits the redundancy between
the two phases of a single lawsuit. The collapsibility of the steps to-
ward injunctive relief generates pressure to treat the entire temporal
and conceptual interval between the preliminary and the final stages as
dispensable. This space of time is occupied by the normal "due"
processes of discovery, pleading, and law and motion matters; when it
is squeezed to the vanishing point, it is as if the same threshold served
as both the entry and the exit of the courthouse. Justice, conceived as
the full panoply of due process rights, is a mere facade when thus re-
duced to two dimensions-a stage fiat or a movie set, instead of an
arena where a real drama unfolds.
The resistance of experience to the bifurcations of theory is best
accounted for in Rule 65 and similar cases by an element of duplicity
that is necessarily included in the operation of the law. At the same
time, the court must entertain reasonable speculations on the outcome
38. See generally Leubsdorf, The Standard for Prelimincry Injunctions, 91 HARV. L.
REV. 525 (1978), and the formulation in Hamilton Watch Co. v. Benrus Watch Co., 206 F.2d
738, 740 (2d Cir. 1953) ("To justify a temporary injunction it is not necessary that the plain-
tiffs right to a final decision, after a trial, be absolutely certain, wholly without doubt; if the
other elements are present (ie., the balance of hardships tips decidedly toward plaintiff), it
will ordinarily be enough that the plaintiff has raised questions going to the merits so seri-
ous, substantial, difficult and doubtful, as to make them a fair ground for litigation and thus
for more deliberate investigation.").
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of the plenary trial, weigh the irreversible effects of present action or
inaction upon all litigants, and assess the prejudice likely to result from
the haste and incompleteness of the knowledge assembled at early
stages of the case. The same evidence, or the same kinds of evidence,
bear on all three points.
The public interest in channeling disputes to the courts, moreover,
is neatly counterbalanced by the risk that any help rendered without
full advice in the premises is apt to be partisan and, therefore, selfish.
Justice is not achieved by balancing or making trade-offs in such cases,
but in electing to prefer one value above another. The value upheld by
withholding preliminary injunctions until information is full enough to
justify confidence that they are needed tends to make preliminary in-
junction hearings very little different from the plenary trials for which
they are supposed to be overtures. Differences in form between the two
types of hearing are smaller than those that distinguish preliminary in-
junctions from temporary restraining orders.39 It is impossible to be
categorical, however, because any particular cause may fall upon a
scale approximating the haste and informality of the T.R.O. at one end
and the plenary trial at the other. General formulation of the rule of
rank in such a sliding scale is considered impossible. No one can spec-
ify in advance the quiddities that move the counter.
A norm that requires resolution of an issue such as the level of
inquiry appropriate for a present justification of provisional relief is a
norm that cries out for description in terms of "equilibrium" or "bal-
ancing." It would thus confirm that our means permit "readings" that
are inconsistent while they remain consistent with the dictates of prece-
dent or code. Verbalizations that are unthinkingly used to objectify
this kind of norm (and to serve as reasons for specific results) fall natu-
rally into the agonistic pattern of other legal discourse. The habits of
lawyerly expression generate a host of correlative terms that invite that
special kind of derision that is reserved for the Catch-22. There are
divisions between the use of the same circumstances as a "sword" or as
a "shield"; 40 discriminations resulting in the characterization of the
same act as feasance or as nonfeasance, 4' or the same order as
39. See FED. R. Civ. P. 65(b); SEC v. Frank, 388 F.2d 486, 490 (2d Cir. 1968)
("[W]here interlocutory relief is truly needed, Rule 65 demands such but only such thor-
oughness as a burdened federal judiciary can reasonably be expected to attain within twenty
days.").
40. See, e.g., Developments in the Law: Res Judicata, 65 HARV. L. REV. 820, 865 (1952).
41. See, e.g., W. PROSSER, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF TORTS § 56, at 339 (4th ed.
1971) ("In theory the difference between the two is simple and obvious; but in practice it is
not always easy to draw the line and say whether conduct is active or passive.").
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mandatory or prohibitory. 42 Such pairs are nutritious fodder for the
critic who wishes to toy with grammatical transformation of the tenses
of black-letter statements or to change the focus of attention to the
other side of the field, making foreground background as he circumam-
bulates the scope of a catchy doctrine.
Important and valuable as such maneuvers may be for tidying the
mansions of the law, they do not accomplish radical change or result in
important insight. One generation clarifies its thought in a series of
dichotomies that appear false or specious to its successors. The next
generation restores sanity or clarity to legal expression by introducing
its own metaphors, exemplified in the present era by the fetish for "bal-
ancing competing interests." The present exercise has, in its way, also
been a contribution to the reinvention of the wheel, or renovation of
the house of Libra-scales, blindfold, and all. However, the language
of criticism, in any of its versions, and very likely the doctrine that it
scrutinizes, too, are concerned ineffably with the understanding and at-
tainment of a virtue that cannot be captured in positive fiats nor in
revelations of the spirit that mediates or animates the social concep-
tions behind them.
When Discretion Supplants Norms
It must be humbly admitted that the virtue of fidelity to an an-
nounced norm, which is the essence of legality, does indeed require the
postulation of as many cruxes as are necessary to define consequences
or name the value of potentiating actions. Every invitation for a sim-
pleton to pepper a brief with exultant "clearlys" is a kind of triumph
for the crusade to make law general, invariable, intelligible to all. The
virtue of true sophistication in legal matters is altogether different,
however, both in its expression and in its implementation. Little is said
of it, because it has dwelt in the casuistic zwischenreich of law and
morals that history assigns to a chancellor.
The virtue of a chancellor is quite distinct from the virtue of
fidelity to an announced norm. It is best understood as a virtue of dis-
cernment, of clear qualitative judgment in a realm of incremental dif-
ferences. The finest subtlety of the faithful follower of the law is a form
of rabbinical elegance that excites admiration and acquiescence; there-
42. See, e.g., Township of South Fayette v. Commonwealth, 477 Pa. 574, 585, 385
A.2d 344, 350 (1978) (Pomeroy, J., concurring) ("In my view, the distinction between
'mandatory' and 'prohibitory' preliminary injunctions is largely illusory and one that we
would do well to abandon."). The orthodox academic ridicule of the distinction is mar-
shalled with citations in the Justice's concurrence.
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fore, it is authoritative even when its detractors take sophistication for
sophistry. The highest attainment of a chancellor can only be called
wisdom or, in its mortal manifestations, soundness. Its presence is rec-
ognized but never demonstrated, as befits the pursuit of principles that
have no clear edges. The authority that commands assent when the
right judgment is spoken by the chancellor is rooted either in charisma
or in tradition. Rationalization of the ruling (whether it is wise or fool-
ish) is ritually prefaced with a recital that "cases differ." Yet, the con-
sistency with powerfully determinant principles that illuminates a
sound ruling is visible to the mind's eye no matter how inartful or even
disingenuous its stated grounds appear to be upon verbal analysis.
The special kind of self-awareness called conscience in a chancel-
lor (and in accounts of judging intended to be complete) is matched, as
we have seen, by a necessary self-reference in the processes by which
all seamless webs are woven, all meanings given voice. The subject of
our concern here, a wry taxonomy of the most common legal ironies,
was inspired by the challenge of initiation and transmission of a cul-
ture. The legal tradition is hard to maintain without a settled mode of
reasoning and exegesis. We make the culture again and again by seek-
ing a set of concepts stable enough to carry an evolving vision of eu-
nomy into practice over appreciable spans of time. An irresolvable
frustration in the work of the social engineer seen as bridge builder is
posed by the antinomy that is implicated in the legal ideal. We de-
mand that our materials be so rigid that ordinary minds may comply
with the demands of a stated order, yet so flexible that the order's spirit
may bend its letter.43
Conclusion
Our thesis has been that sometimes, the legal "point well taken"
may be set with beautiful precision by a rule. The rule, however, fixes
the point by according worth and merit to proofs, arguments, and doc-
trinal formulae that we have so far found no stable patterns for or-
ganizing, describing, normalizing. For this reason, the task of
judgment is delegated to officials familiar with the cases made out by
disputants and with the interests that guide the application of the ruling
conception we all hold of the commonweal (as stated in written norms).
Such familiarity is in semantic opposition to the formality of legal
processes, but it has everything to do with the respect and the authority
generally accorded to the judicial office. The gap filled by the judge is
43. See R. UNGER, KNOWLEDGE AND POLITICS 72-76 (1975).
one lying between general statements and particular applications. The
space that it encloses is intimate as it is familiar. In it, there is no more
freedom for the expression of individual predilections (under the
vaguely pejorative cover of "discretion") than there is for a couple to
live a lie year after year while sharing the same roof.
The presence of what we have at times called "feedback," along
with our other occasions for irony at the expense of the legal order, is
not meant to signal a belief that there is a significant sphere for the
whimsical use of public authority, as some critics of "discretionary jus-
tice" would suggest. On the contrary, the kinds of clumsiness we have
dealt with exhibit a healthy confidence that somewhere in our system of
beliefs there is a place of convergence, a consensus, so strong that we
may successfully deputize fallible beings to calculate the single, optimal
result that derives from our laws as well as our mores. Sadly, too often
the result must be taken on faith (until better tropes are found) as cor-
responding with the foreordained and, therefore, ascertainable decision
of any and all equally honest and informed persons learned in the law.
A decree (and a legal judgment insofar as it is ineluctably decretal)
mirrors a final judgment that any of us would have reached from a
perspective of historical omniscience, if it were attainable.
We strive to attain that ideal, peering through dark glasses and
seeing something that words cannot express either before or after the
law has run its course. All we know, in truth, is all that we commonly
suppose: that the intuitions that inform judgment within the "parame-
ters" of even the phoniest rationality are not usually at odds with the
positive guidelines found in regulations and precedents. The principles
of a law-respecting order, including the rights to advance notice, con-
sistency in treatment, confrontation, and an adversary process of in-
quiry into fact, all can and do consist with the exercise of such
essentially moral intuitions as those we have examined. This appears
to be so because the determinacy that may be effectuated by a faithful
allegiance to words and texts operates through obscure causes.
The mysterious privacy of deliberation-the work of cham-
bers-normally enfolds and sustains the workings of a rational con-
science. The faculty or intuition we call judgment is like a laboratory
operated by alchemists: from its interiors we are brought results and
encouraged with reports of progress in the search for the philosopher's
stone. We may, indeed, delude ourselves in feeling comfort, as we gen-
erally seem to do, in these announcements, but our experience justifies
trust in the safety of our practice of leaving the ceremented oracles of
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order to their true ministry-the familiar magic of nuance and the em-
pirical testing of nostrums hallowed by time.

